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This article identifies common features of existing models of radicalization and 
deradicalization, such as the transition from uncertainty to certainty, before integrating 
these in a model based upon personal construct theory. It is proposed that the personal 
construct concepts of validation and invalidation are particularly relevant to processes of 
identity change such as radicalization and deradicalization. Thus, it is argued that 
radicalization occurs when major invalidation of an individual’s construing is followed by 
the development of a new radicalized view of the world that provides a turning point in 
his or her sense of identity and a more structured and certain view of the world. There is 
likely to be seeking out of validation for this view in interactions with others who share 
similar views or by extorting evidence for the individual’s radical constructions. These 
constructions are likely to involve extreme negative views of another group, by contrast 
to members of which, and possibly by taking extreme action against this group, the 
individual’s new self-construction may become further defined. These same processes 
can be seen to operate in deradicalization, and it will therefore be argued that the model 
has implications for the development of deradicalization programs. A further advantage 
of the model is that it has an associated personal construct methodology, particularly 
repertory grid technique, that may be used to investigate processes of radicalization and 
deradicalization. As illustrations of such investigations, results will be summarized from a 
repertory grid study of Salafist Muslims in Tunisia, some of whom had returned from 
fighting in Syria, and an analysis of the writings of the Norwegian mass murderer Anders 
Breivik. The findings of these investigations are argued to be consistent with the personal 
construct model of radicalization and deradicalization.
Keywords: repertory grid, personal construct, identity, sense of identity, identity fusion, uncertainty, construal
INTRODUCTION
The crucial importance of increasing our understanding of radicalization is highlighted by 
definitions of the term in strategies and policy recommendations concerning the countering 
of terrorism and violent extremism. For example, the UK government has defined it as “The 
process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, 
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then join terrorist groups” (HM Government, 2009, p.  11), 
while a European Union definition is “a phenomenon of people 
who regard the use of violence as legitimate and/or use violence 
themselves in order to achieve their political objectives which 
undermine the democratic legal order and the fundamental 
rights on which it is based” (European Union Committee of 
the Regions, 2016, p.  4). These definitions reflect concerns 
about young people whose radicalization has involved choosing 
the path of what has been somewhat inaccurately described 
(Post et  al., 2009) as violent Jihad, or of violence with very 
different ideological roots. However, people may develop radical 
views without supporting, or participating in, violence, and 
indeed in certain areas of our lives most of us hold views 
which might be  considered extreme, at least by some others 
(Neumann, 2003; Mandel, 2010; Borum, 2011a; Bartlett and 
Miller, 2012). Also, what is radical in one social, cultural, or 
temporal context may not be  so regarded in another.
This paper will concern itself with the development by an 
individual of all-pervading views which may be  considered 
radical in his or her social context, and with the circumstances 
in which these may lead to violent action, as well as with the 
converse process of deradicalization. Previous research has 
sought in vain for a profile, in terms of psychopathology, 
personality features, or economic deprivation, of people who 
have become radicalized and/or engaged in terrorism (Horgan, 
2003; McCauley, 2004; Silke, 2008; Gartenstein-Ross and 
Grossman, 2009; McGilloway et al., 2015). Nevertheless, various 
explanations of the process of radicalization have been proposed, 
and we  shall consider their common features before outlining 
an alternative model.
It has been suggested that prior to radicalization the individual 
experiences a state of uncertainty about the self and the world 
(Hogg et  al., 2010, 2013; Hogg, 2012; Doosje et  al., 2013; Klein 
and Kruglanski, 2013; Meeus, 2015), and existential anxiety 
(McBride, 2011). Among the contributing factors to this may 
be  perceived relative deprivation, for example for immigrants 
in comparison to their status in their countries of origin or 
to indigenous people of the host country, or failure to fulfill 
one’s aspirations (Moghaddam, 2005); experienced prejudice and 
perceived exclusion from an ingroup (Stroink, 2007; Victoroff 
et  al., 2012); alienation (Horgan, 2008; Wilner and Dubouloz, 
2010); threats to one’s collective identity as a result of globalization 
(Moghaddam, 2012); and mortality salience (Pyszczynski et  al., 
2006). These factors may include conditions in the individual’s 
social context or personal crises or “disorienting dilemmas” 
that act as “transformative triggers” (Wilner and Dubouloz, 
2010) and “turning points” (McAdams and Bowman, 2001) or 
provide “cognitive openings” (Wiktorowicz, 2005) and a “readiness 
to change.” In such situations, the person may be  particularly 
prone to identity transformation. As indicated by social identity 
theory (Tajfel and Jones, 1979), this, coupled with an increase 
in self-esteem, may be  facilitated by identification with an 
available social category, such as might be provided by a radical 
group (Taylor and Louis, 2004; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). The 
individual may become increasingly socialized into this group 
(Silke, 2008; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010) by face-to-face contact or 
internet “echo rooms” (Geeraerts, 2012), while becoming relatively 
isolated from wider society, including his or her previous social 
network. The radical group, with its “high entativity” (coherence) 
and extreme, clear, and simple view of the world (Savage and 
Liht, 2008; Liht and Savage, 2013), perhaps expressed in terms 
of a “sacred canopy” of religious beliefs (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967; Griffin, 2012), may provide a sense of certainty (Hogg, 
2012) about the world, the future, and the self (and even about 
life after death in some cases!).
The individual’s identity may then become “fused” with that 
of the group, increasing his or her willingness to die for the 
group if it is threatened (Swann et  al., 2009, 2014; Whitehouse 
et  al., 2014; Atran, 2016), especially if it has a “culture of 
martyrdom” (Gill, 2007). This may be  particularly so if the 
worldview embraced involves grievances toward a demonized, 
hated, and dehumanized other group (Bandura, 1999; McCauley 
and Moskalenko, 2011; Monahan, 2012) because one’s identity 
may be  strengthened by contrast with the other (Herriott, 
2009). As Alford (2005) puts it, “Hatred is self-structure on 
the cheap” (p.  252) and “hate gives meaning to life” (p.  239). 
Involvement in violent extremism may also fulfill the person’s 
“quest for significance” (Kruglanski et  al., 2009, 2014; Webber 
et  al., 2017) and status (Bartlett and Miller, 2012) in his or 
her particular social context. Borum (2003, 2011b) considers 
that violent action against a vilified group is often the end of 
a process in which this group is blamed for socioeconomic 
deprivation experienced by the group with which a terrorist 
identifies and which is perceived as unjust.
In short, previous analyses of radicalization suggest that a 
state of uncertainty may make an individual open to identification 
with a group whose radical views, including demonization of 
another group, provide a new sense of certainty, possibly 
including a justification for violent action against the other group.
PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY
In his writings on radicalization and violent extremism, Borum 
(2003), p. 8, stresses understanding of the terrorist’s “mind-set” 
and “own internal ‘map’ of reality” to anticipate his or her 
actions. The model which we shall propose aims to understand 
the radicalized person’s “own internal ‘map’ of reality” by using 
the concepts of Kelly (1955) personal construct theory (PCT). 
One of the first examples of a constructivist approach in 
psychology, this asserts that people are primarily concerned 
with anticipating, and giving meaning to, their worlds, which 
they do by developing hierarchically organized systems of 
bipolar personal constructs (e.g., “good” versus “evil”) in which 
some constructs are more superordinate, or important, than 
others. Not only individuals, but also families, groups, societies, 
and cultures, may be  viewed as operating with their own 
construct systems, and the theory is thus as applicable to social 
as to individual constructions and processes (Procter, 2016).
Their constructs allow people to discriminate between events, 
and essentially provide the goggles through which the world 
is viewed and the basis for the predictions and choices that 
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people make. The individual’s constructions of aspects of the 
world may be subsequently validated or invalidated. The optimally 
functioning person will generally revise his or her constructions 
if they are invalidated, and construing is therefore a cyclical 
process [referred to by Kelly (1970) as the Experience Cycle] 
in which the individual, similar to a scientist, constantly 
formulates hypotheses about his or her world, tests them out, 
refines them if necessary, and retests them. Kelly (1955) also 
outlined two other cyclical processes central to the person’s 
construction and reconstruction of their world. In one of these, 
the Creativity Cycle, the person’s construing becomes looser, 
or more vague and flexible, allowing constructs to be “reshuffled,” 
before tightening again, enabling new predictions to be  made 
and tested. The other cycle, the Circumspection-Preemption-
Control Cycle, concerns decision-making and involves the 
person considering all the constructs relevant to a decision, 
focusing on the most superordinate of these, and selecting 
one pole of this construct as the basis of his or her decision.
Kelly (1969a) viewed the individual’s construct system as 
providing his or her identity, and indicated that certain 
superordinate constructs, referred to as core constructs, are 
particularly central in this regard. The prospect of a 
comprehensive challenge to a person’s core constructs will 
provoke threat, while guilt will be  experienced if the person 
experiences behaving in a way that is discrepant from his or 
her “core role,” or customary view of the self. If the person 
finds that his or her constructs do not enable the anticipation 
of events, he  or she will experience anxiety. While, as we  have 
seen, the person may be able to reduce anxiety by reconstruing 
events if his or her constructions are invalidated, some types 
of construct system are more conducive to the accommodation 
of reconstruing than are others. If, for example, a person’s 
view of the world is unidimensional and undifferentiated, no 
alternative constructions of events may be  possible and the 
impact of invalidation may be  massive in that it may lead to 
structural collapse of the whole system. Sometimes, therefore, 
rather than changing his or her constructions after invalidation, 
the person will attempt to change the world to make it fit 
with these constructions, a process that Kelly (1955) described 
as hostility. Other strategies for dealing with, or attempting 
to avoid, invalidation include constricting one’s world to exclude 
events that may be  incompatible with one’s construing, or 
conversely dilating one’s world, throwing oneself into new 
experiences such that this may lead to development of ways 
of construing that will resolve the previous inconsistencies.
PCT views sociality, construing the other person’s construction 
processes and essentially attempting to see the world through 
his or her eyes, as the basis of interpersonal relationships. 
Similarly, Kelly (1955) enjoined the psychologist to take a 
“credulous attitude” to the other person, taking his or her view 
of the world seriously and at face value even if one disagrees 
with it. Viewed from the perspective of the individual’s construct 
system, even the most apparently self-destructive choices can 
be  comprehended as attempts by the individual to predict the 
world or to avoid invalidation of construing and the accompanying 
anxiety and threat (Winter, 1992). For example, some people 
may take the choice of suicide because their lives are so chaotic 
that death provides the only certainty (Neimeyer and Winter, 
2006). PCT may also provide an understanding of choices and 
actions that are destructive of others (although this, of course, 
does not imply condoning them), and its concepts have been 
used in formulations of cases of extreme violence, including 
homicide (Winter, 2007, 2016).
Kelly’s “first principle” was that “if you  do not know what 
is wrong with a person, ask him; he  may tell you” (Kelly, 
1955, pp.  322–323). Spinzak has taken this advice in exploring 
violent extremism in that he  reportedly remarked that “the 
best way to find out what leads people along the path of 
extremism, what leads people to be  willing to kill in the name 
of their cause, is – to ask them!” (Post et  al., 2003, p.  171). 
We  shall now consider how the PCT concepts that we  have 
described may be  applied to the process of radicalization, 
including violent extremism, as it has been outlined in the 
previous literature that we have reviewed. We shall then describe 
PCT methods that may be  used to ask the person what has 
led him or her along this path.
A PCT MODEL OF RADICALIZATION
From a PCT perspective, the pathway toward radicalization, 
which is presented in Figure 1, may be  considered to consist 
of several stages.
1. The radicalized individual has a history of invalidation of 
his/her construing, particularly in regard to core aspects of 
self-construing.
The various factors that in previous research have been identified 
as contributing to an individual’s state of uncertainty prior to 
radicalization may all be  viewed as involving invalidation of 
the person’s construing. They may range from experiences in 
close personal relationships, for example at the level of family 
dynamics, to broader social adversities, such as rejection, 
prejudice, humiliation, and other perceived grievances. The 
individual’s resulting difficulty in construing his or her world 
will be  experienced as anxiety, together with threat if core 
constructs are involved. There will also be  guilt if the person’s 
experiences lead to dislodgement from his or her core role, 
for example by being denied the opportunities that would 
enable the self to continue to be  viewed as successful or able 
to provide for his or her family.
 2. This sometimes involves one or more episodes that lead to 
massive invalidation, and act as “transformative triggers.”
Massive invalidation occurs when the superordinate structure 
of the construct system, including core constructs, become 
disconfirmed in a short period of time, leaving the system 
with no capacity to carry out its fundamental function of 
providing a structure with which to anticipate and understand 
events. From the PCT perspective, the resulting extreme 
uncertainty will be  experienced as intense anxiety and as very 
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threatening when core constructs are comprehensively challenged. 
The individual who is faced with these emotions, coupled 
perhaps with feelings of rage, desperation, sadness, and emptiness, 
will find life difficult to manage in both the short and long term.
 3. The individual with a very undifferentiated (and thus inflexible) 
construct system may be  particularly vulnerable to such 
invalidation and consequent structural collapse.
An undifferentiated, or unidimensional, construct system offers 
a restricted view of events so that when a personal construction 
becomes invalidated the system does not provide alternative 
viewpoints which would permit a more complex understanding 
of events. The only possible reconstruction may be  what Kelly 
(1969b) termed slot rattling, construing an event or person 
at the opposite pole of the construct dimension to that at 
which it was previously construed (e.g., “if John is not good 
then he  must be  bad,” no other alternatives are considered). 
If reconstruction is not possible the system collapses and fails 
in its main function: to provide an explanation of current 
events and, thus, a future perspective for upcoming events. 
The resulting extreme uncertainty may be experienced as chaos.
 4. His/her radical beliefs, usually drawing upon available social 
constructions, allow the development of a “turning point” in 
his or her sense of identity with a more structured and certain 
view of the world.
Faced with invalidation and uncertainty, the person may engage 
in cycles of construing and reconstruing in order to search 
for an alternative way of giving meaning to his or her experiences 
and reducing anxiety and threat. This is likely to be  found 
in some socially available conceptual/ideological frame (or 
system of constructs) different from the one which has just 
been invalidated, such as a radical worldview. This view may 
then be held with 100% certainty, providing a firm new structure 
for, and means of anticipating, the individual’s world. Guilt 
will also be  reduced if the person develops, and acts in 
accordance with, a new core role as a member of a radical group.
 5. The development of an extreme negative construction of another 
group, which may be perceived as responsible for the individual’s 
invalidations, allows further definition of the self by contrast 
with this group.
The individual’s new worldview is likely to involve an extreme 
negative construction of some other group. The nature of this 
group (which may, for example, be  formed of infidels, 
homosexuals, immigrants or supporters of a particular football 
team) is in many ways irrelevant, but what is crucial is that 
it allows the person to structure an equally extreme positive 
identity by contrast to members of the vilified group. As stated 
by the personal construct theorist Neimeyer (2002), p.  298, 
italics in original, “demonized others may be a critical condition 
for maintaining the phenomenological validity of our position.”
FIGURE 1 | A personal construct heuristic model for the process of radicalization and deradicalization. Vertical arrows indicate “Transformative Trigger”.  
*Broader context includes social and political national/international conflicts, economic inequalities, religious fundamentalist confronted discourses (in worship  
places or web pages), social marginalization, and stigmatization.
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 6. The individual’s radical constructions are validated by contact 
with others who share similar views, often coupled with 
constriction of their previous social world to avoid 
further invalidation.
Often, individuals in the process of radicalization will increasingly 
limit their social contacts to a selected group of individuals, to 
whom their identity is linked and who become the primary 
source of validation of their constructions. This may involve them 
actively seeking out contact with radical groups, but may also 
result from an active and systematic recruitment campaign by 
such a group. Becoming a “member” of that club comes with 
a number of social benefits and strong feelings of “oneness,” the 
phenomenon that Swann et al. (2014) described as “identity fusion”.
 7. The likelihood of acting upon radical beliefs, including violent 
actions, is greater in those individuals in whom beliefs in 
such actions provide the greatest increment in the structure 
of his/her view of the self.
In some radicalized individuals, taking extreme actions in 
accordance with their radical beliefs may enable their self-
construing to become even more structured and consistent 
with their new core roles. This may, for example, involve 
actualizing an identity as a martyr for a religious cause or a 
warrior in search of ultimate justice. In all such cases, there 
is absolute certainty (even the certainty of death) and a definite 
course of action with no consideration of potential alternatives, 
no shades of grey.
 8. Reconstruing of violence as acceptable may be  necessary if 
the person is to engage in such acts without guilt (and indeed 
to experience guilt for not engaging in them).
The person who commits an act of violence will be  likely to 
experience guilt if the self has always been construed as gentle, 
but not if the violence can be  construed as a legitimate aspect 
of the person’s self-construction, perhaps being seen as in 
pursuit of some worthy or “supreme” goal. Thus, for a person 
adopting a radical Jihadi identity violence might become not 
just legitimate but the privileged road to reach heaven. Not 
becoming committed to that path in one way or another might 
provoke guilt.
 9. His/her radical view of the world may be  shored up by 
“hostility,” in Kelly (1955) sense of extorting evidence for the 
individual’s constructions.
Since reality is complex (and with some areas of uncertainty), 
the certainty provided by a radical construct system can only 
be  maintained if the person ignores invalidation and/or 
manufactures validation. Thus, Kellyan hostility permits the 
disregarding of any evidence which might invalidate the newly 
acquired radical identity and creating instances which conform 
to these constructions of self and others.
 10.  Similar processes may operate in members of the “other” 
group, creating a vicious cycle of extreme construing based 
on mutual validation of extreme negative views of the other.
Hostility may become a cyclical process in which two groups 
each act in such a way that provokes behavior that validates 
each group’s negative constructions of the other. The resulting 
conflict escalation may be  a fundamental terrorist goal 
(Louis  and  Taylor, 2002), a strategy that has been referred to 
as “jujitsu politics,” “using the enemy’s strength against him” 
(McCauley  and  Moskalenko, 2008, p.  427).
The radicalization process need not involve an individual 
progressing through all the stages outlined above, and certain 
stages may be  more relevant to some people than to others. 
For example, it should be  noted that the individual who is 
socialized from childhood into a world view that involves extreme 
constructions of another group cannot really be  considered to 
become radicalized by adopting such constructions. Nevertheless, 
the later stages of the proposed model can be  used to explain 
why some such individuals proceed to a path of radical action 
which provides more structure and certainty in their self-construing 
than, for example, a non-violent self-construction. Similarly, these 
stages may also be relevant to radical actions taken by individuals 
who join a radical group because of reasons more associated, 
for example, with criminality or thrill seeking than with the 
adoption of radical beliefs, but for whom radical acts can then 
enhance their identities.
Aspects of the proposed model can also be  used to explain 
deradicalization. For example, an individual may become 
amenable to deradicalization after experiencing major invalidation 
in relation to his or her radical views. However, he  or she is 
only likely to become deradicalized if a view of the world is 
available that provides at least as much structure and certainty 
as did the radical beliefs, and that is validated by others who 
share similar views. After the worldview full of certainty that 
he  or she had embraced becomes invalidated all will appear 
to be  confusing and the previously existing social validation 
will vanish. Assistance needed at this point will involve much 
support for developing a more complex, differentiated view of 
reality, social validation, and also engagement in creating a 
new sense of identity associated with a commitment to a life 
project which might be  less deterministic and more prosocial.
PERSONAL  CONSTRUCT 
METHODOLOGY FOR THE 
EXPLORATION OF  RADICALIZATION
A major advantage of PCT is that it provides not only theoretical 
concepts which encompass a wide variety of theoretical formulations 
about violent radicalization but also a very flexible methodology. 
The most widely used such method is the repertory grid (Fransella 
et  al., 2004). The grid allows exploration of both the content 
and structure of a person’s construct system, including areas 
that, being at a low level of awareness, would be  difficult to 
access by a conventional interview. Since it considers the individual’s 
own constructs rather than using pre-established items, it is well 
suited to investigations in different cultural settings, and it has 
been used in exploring the construing of survivors of a brutal 
civil war in Africa, including both perpetrators and victims of 
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extreme violence (Winter et  al., 2016), and in elucidating the 
different pathways to radicalization of Jihadi terrorists in India 
(Sarangi et al., 2013). Also of possible relevance to the experiences 
of individuals prior to radicalization is that grid indices of 
difficulty in construing oneself and others have been related to 
measures of hopelessness (Winter D. et al., 2007) and alienation 
(Winter et  al., 2009).
The usual procedure for individual administration of the 
repertory grid is to ask the person to provide a list of elements 
of his or her world, normally aspects of the self and significant 
others; to give constructs by comparing and contrasting groups 
of these elements; and then to rate all of the elements on each 
of the constructs thus elicited. A variation on this procedure 
which has been tailored to the exploration of radicalization and 
deradicalization (Winter, 2010) uses a set of elements consisting 
of members of the radical group, including the self after 
radicalization; another set consisting of people who are not 
members of this group, including the self before radicalization; 
and the ideal self. Constructs are then elicited separately from 
the “radical” and the “non-radical” elements. With the aid of 
computer software, it is possible to derive from such a grid 
measures of: (1) increments in the structure of the construct 
system and predictability of the world when an individual adopts 
a radicalized rather than a non-radicalized perspective; (2) 
reduction in dilemmas and conflicts (Feixas and Saúl, 2004; 
Bell, 2014) in the radicalized as compared to the non-radicalized 
self; (3) increase in self-esteem when the radicalized rather than 
the non-radicalized perspective is adopted; and (4) relative 
positivity of the individual’s construing of radicalized as compared 
to non-radicalized people. More specifically, these grid measures 
include: (1) the relative intercorrelations between each set of 
constructs (“radical” and “non-radical”) and their relative sums 
of squares (the extent to which they discriminate between the 
elements), together with the relative sums of squares (indicating 
salience or meaningfulness) of the radical and non-radical 
elements; (2) measures of logical inconsistency in the construing 
of the radicalized and non-radicalized self; (3) relative dissimilarity 
in the construing of the radicalized and non-radicalized selves 
and that of the ideal self; (4) relative dissimilarity in the construing 
of radicalized and non-radicalized people and that of the ideal self.
Another assessment method that Kelly (1955) devised as an 
application of his credulous approach is the self-characterization, 
in which the person is asked to write an autobiographical 
description as if it were written by someone who knows him 
or her well and is sympathetic. A variation on this procedure 
which might be  useful in the study of radicalization would 
be  the writing of descriptions of the self before and after 
radicalization. Analysis of a self-characterization will consider 
both its organization and its content, but a particular focus is 
likely to be  on the constructs used within it. PCT concepts 
(or, as Kelly termed them, professional constructs) are then 
applied to produce a formulation (Winter and Procter, 2013) 
based on the self-characterization and any other relevant material. 
As described by Feixas and Villegas (1991), longer pieces of 
text may be  converted into, and analyzed as, repertory grids, 
a method that has been used to analyze books written by a 
serial killer (Winter D. A. et al., 2007) and the Commandant 
of Auschwitz concentration camp (Reed et  al., 2014).
There are several other personal construct, or more broadly 
constructivist, assessment methods (Neimeyer, 1993; Caputi 
et  al., 2012; Bell, 2016). Some of these focus on change in 
construing or resistance to such change, and therefore may 
be particularly relevant to investigating the reconstruing involved 
in radicalization and deradicalization. For example, Experience 
Cycle Methodology (Oades and Viney, 2012) is a structured 
interview that considers the stages that the individual has gone 
through in testing out and, if necessary, revising their 
constructions. The ABC model (Tschudi and Winter, 2011), 
by considering the positive and negative implications of each 
pole of a construct, may elucidate the individual’s choices and 
the reasons why it may be  difficult for him or her to change.
We shall now illustrate how some of these approaches have 
been used in investigating the personal construct model 
of radicalization.
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE 
PERSONAL  CONSTRUCT MODEL 
OF  RADICALIZATION
A Study of Salafist Muslims
This study investigated young people in Tunisia who had 
identified with Salafism, a branch of Sunni Islam that calls 
for a return to the practices of the first Muslims (Muhanna-
Matar and Winter, 2017; Winter and Muhanna-Matar, 2019). 
While some Salafists are committed to a path of Jihad, others 
reject the use of violence.
Five male and one female participants, with a mean age 
of 26.3  years, were recruited from young people who took 
part in a larger study using a narrative interview on the basis 
that they were willing to complete a repertory grid in addition 
to the interview. Two of them had become deradicalized. The 
grid that they completed followed the procedure described 
above developed by Winter (2010).
As described by Winter and Muhanna-Matar (2019), the 
narrative interviews clearly indicated the cycles of construing 
and reconstruing (involving Kelly’s Experience, Creativity, and 
Circumspection-Preemption-Control Cycles as well as oscillation 
between constriction and dilation) in which the participants 
had engaged on their paths to radicalization and, in two 
cases, deradicalization. While the interviews thus elucidated 
construing processes, the repertory grid was able to indicate 
features of the structure and content of the participants’ 
construing consistent with the personal construct model. 
Specifically, it was found that participants’ self-constructions 
as members of the group with which they currently identified 
were significantly less conflictual and more positive than their 
self-constructions as non-members of this group. They also 
construed members of the group with which they identified 
significantly more positively than non-members. The grid 
therefore complemented the interviews by providing further 
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evidence that identification with a particular group allowed 
each of these young people to develop a more certain and 
favorable construction of the self.
These findings can be  illustrated by considering two 
participants, one who remained radicalized and another who 
had become deradicalized. The grid of the former participant, 
Sami, who since becoming radicalized has “never felt happy 
like how I  feel now… I  have found a balanced style of life” 
(Muhanna-Matar and Winter, 2017, p.  397), indicated that 
Salafists, including himself as a Salafist, were much more 
salient, favorably construed, and associated with less conflict 
(and therefore more certainty) in his construing than 
non-Salafists, including himself before radicalization. This 
example can be  contrasted with the grid of Saleem, who 
became deradicalized after following the path of Jihad to 
Syria and experiencing the major invalidation of finding 
himself fighting another Jihadist group, including his friend. 
As he said, “I went to Syria to join Jihadists who fight against 
the Bashar regime, not to fight against each other” (Muhanna-
Matar and Winter, 2017, p.  405). He  now considered that 
“I have become a different person” (p.  407). In his grid, 
non-Salafists were more salient, more favorably construed, 
and associated with less conflict than Salafists. There were 
also more dilemmas in his construing of his Salafist than 
non-Salafist self. For example, he viewed the former as “socially 
isolated,” “quick tempered,” and “pessimistic” (his own words), 
and although his preference was to be  “sociable,” “sober 
minded,” and “optimistic,” his dilemma was that he associated 
these preferred characteristics with such negative implications 
as being “careless” and “fearful.”
A Study of a Mass Murderer, 
Anders Breivik
Before setting out on a “mission” in which he killed 77 people, 
mostly at a Labor party youth camp, the Norwegian terrorist 
Anders Breivik circulated on the internet a 1,516-page 
compendium entitled “2083: A European Declaration of 
Independence” (Winter and Tschudi, 2015). A 66-page section 
of his compendium, described as an interview with a “Justiciar 
Knight Commander of the PCCTS Knights Templar,” is clearly 
an interview of Breivik by himself, and as such (particularly 
38 pages devoted to his “personal life and convictions”) is 
similar to a self-characterization.
Breivik’s interview with himself was analyzed as if it were 
a self-characterization by extracting constructs from it and 
viewing it in terms of the professional constructs of PCT. 
We  shall now map material from the “interview” and other 
information about Breivik onto the PCT model of radicalization.
 1. The radicalized individual has a history of invalidation of 
his/her construing, particularly in regard to core aspects of 
self-construing.
From childhood to adolescence, and in his later ventures 
into politics and business, Breivik seemed to have suffered 
a long series of invalidations (Winter and Tschudi, 2015), 
although he minimized these. For example, despite childhood 
events including his parents’ divorce, a battle for his custody, 
his father’s second divorce, and loss of contact with his 
father, he said that he did not have “any negative experiences 
in” his “childhood in any way” (Berwick, 2011, p.  1387), 
reserving criticism for the sociopolitical systems he  saw as 
influencing his family. His experiences when he  attempted 
to dedicate his life to politics included invalidation of his 
view that it would be  possible to change the system 
democratically. His business ventures were no more successful 
in that he  went bankrupt, but he  was able to reconstrue 
this apparent invalidation as a cost-efficient way of raising 
money for new ventures.
 2. This sometimes involves one or more episodes that lead to 
massive invalidation, and act as “transformative triggers.”
A particularly significant episode of invalidation in adolescence 
seems to have been the rejection of “the Norwegian way” by 
his best friend, a Muslim, who began to assault and harass 
ethnic Norwegians. However, he regards the episode that “tipped 
the scales” for him as the Norwegian government’s support 
of the bombing of Serbia when “all” the Serbs “wanted” was 
“to drive Islam out” (Berwick, 2011, p.  1380).
 3. The individual with a very undifferentiated (and thus inflexible) 
construct system may be  particularly vulnerable to such 
invalidation and consequent structural collapse.
Undifferentiated construing may be  indicated by psychiatric 
reports that Breivik as a child was cautious, controlled, and 
lacked spontaneity, imagination, and empathy (Seierstad, 2015).
 4. His/her radical beliefs, usually drawing upon available social 
constructions, allow the development of a “turning point” in 
his or her sense of identity with a more structured and certain 
view of the world.
Breivik’s radical beliefs led to re-establishment of himself “on 
an existential level” as more moral and responsible than the 
“self centred fuck” he  used to be  (Berwick, 2011, p.  1406). 
As he  said in relation to his ethnic Norwegian “brothers and 
sisters,” “my love for them exceeds my own self serving interests. 
That’s not the kind of person I  used to be, but it’s the kind 
of person that I  have become” (Berwick, 2011, p.  1403). In 
contrast to his previous existence of “pretty shallow ambitions… 
in a society in complete moral decay where you  are detached 
from your extended family, your community, the Church and 
with little national and cultural identity and pride etc.,” (Berwick, 
2011, p.  1402), he  considered that “I have never been happier 
than I  am  now” (p.  1403).
As described by Winter and Tschudi (2015), the choices that 
Breivik made were elucidated by applying an ABC model analysis 
to his description of the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of the alternative options of “completely focusing on tasks as 
part of the European resistance movement” or “creating a large 
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family.” While he  viewed the latter option as involving “living 
an easy life” and “avoiding suffering,” the former enabled 
him  to  see himself as a “good”, “selfless” man rather than a 
“guilty” “coward”, a “miserable creature” and “apathetic hypocrite.”
 5. The development of an extreme negative construction of another 
group, which may be perceived as responsible for the individual’s 
invalidations, allows further definition of the self by contrast 
with this group.
The vilification of cultural Marxists allowed him to see himself 
as “a destroyer of multiculturalism, … a destroyer of evil and 
a bringer of light” (Berwick, 2011, p.  1435). The threats that 
he had experienced were attributed to the forces of multiculturalism, 
and, as he  wrote, “Fighting for your people’s survival, when 
threatened, is the most logical thing to do.”
 6. The individual’s radical constructions are validated by contact 
with others who share similar views, often coupled with constriction 
of their previous social world to avoid further invalidation.
Breivik essentially constricted his world by retiring to his bedroom 
for several years, initially to play war games and then to research 
on the internet the material that he  used in writing his 
compendium. He  described this as “a process I  used in order 
to isolate myself from most of my network…. to completely 
‘detach myself from ‘the game’, my ‘former shallow consumerist 
lifestyle’” (Berwick, 2011, p.  1381). During this period, he  tried 
to make email contact with those who shared similar views.
 7. The likelihood of acting upon radical beliefs, including violent 
actions, is greater in those individuals in whom beliefs in 
such actions provide the greatest increment in the structure 
of his/her view of the self.
It seems likely that, for Breivik, violent action enabled him to 
achieve the ultimate further structuring of his identity as “The 
Perfect Knight I  have always strived to be” (Berwick, 2011, 
p.  1435), as well as ensuring that his views reached a much 
wider audience, and potential sources of validation, than those 
to whom he  sent his “European Declaration of Independence.”
 8. Reconstruing of violence as acceptable may be  necessary if 
the person is to engage in such acts without guilt (and indeed 
to experience guilt for not engaging in them).
Breivik construed himself as someone who “wouldn’t be willing 
to hurt a fly and… never used violence against others” (Berwick, 
2011, p.  1395). Nevertheless, he  seemed able subsequently to 
avoid guilt following his murderous actions by maintaining 
that “I acted out of goodness, not evil… under normal conditions 
I  am  a very nice person.” For him, “There are situations in 
which cruelty is necessary, and refusing to apply necessary 
cruelty is a betrayal of the people whom you  wish to protect” 
(Berwick, 2011, p.  846). Therefore, according to his beliefs, 
what would have been likely to cause him to feel guilt would 
have been failing to commit the murders.
 9. His/her radical view of the world may be  shored up by 
“hostility,” in Kelly (1955) sense of extorting evidence for the 
individual’s constructions.
Breivik’s hostility (in Kelly’s sense) was evident in such statements 
as that if constructions of Muslims as violent were not validated, 
this could “be achieved by provoking and inciting them 
to  choose the path of Jihad prematurely,” by “pin prick 
attacks”  on “their most prized ‘possessions’, their women” 
(Berwick, 2011, p.  930).
 10. Similar processes may operate in members of the “other” 
group, creating a vicious cycle of extreme construing based 
on mutual validation of extreme negative views of the other.
Breivik made it clear that his aim was to create a “spiral” of 
radicalization which “will polarize societies.”
ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF 
THE PERSONAL CONSTRUCT MODEL
The studies of Salafist Muslims and of Anders Breivik, while 
using different methodologies, have both provided findings 
consistent with the personal construct model of radicalization. 
This model can be  considered to have numerous benefits. 
Firstly, similar to personal construct approaches in other fields, 
such as psychotherapy (Neimeyer, 1988), the model is sufficiently 
permeable and holistic to integrate numerous existing models. 
It can encompass both individual and, as indicated by Procter 
(2016), societal processes of construing, and suggests 
predisposing factors to radicalization at individual and societal 
levels. Importantly, it explains the choices and actions of the 
radicalized individual in terms of the same processes of 
construing as operate in any other personal choice, and 
therefore does not pathologize the radicalized person. Similarly, 
its “credulous attitude” is concerned with understanding, rather 
than condemning and “waging war upon,” the radicalized 
person’s view of the world. The model explains both 
radicalization and deradicalization in terms of similar processes, 
and, by drawing upon methods used in personal and relational 
construct psychotherapy (Winter and Viney, 2005; Procter 
and Winter, 2019), can offer a range of interventions for 
facilitating reconstruing which could be  used in individual 
tailoring of deradicalization programs. Detailing such approaches 
is beyond the scope of the present paper, but they could 
include interventions designed to develop an alternative 
structured view of the world and/or focused on the resolution 
of dilemmas associated with becoming deradicalized (Feixas, 
2016). Perhaps most significantly, the personal construct model 
has an associated methodology which allows empirical 
exploration of the construing of radicalized people and 
monitoring of changes during deradicalization. This 
methodology combines the advantages of both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, and can be  applied not only in an 
individual interview format but also to the construing of 
groups and to textual material.
The model’s primary limitation is that the evidence on which 
it is based is limited. Further research is therefore necessary, 
and current investigations include studies of the relationships 
between measures derived from the repertory grid method 
developed for the study of radicalization and measures of 
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degree of identification and “fusion” with the groups to which 
individuals are affiliated. The model will also be  tested by 
deductive thematic analysis of material provided by people 
who have been radicalized.
At present, however, the model can at least be  regarded 
as offering a heuristic that provides a way of understanding 
and empirically investigating the choices involved in 
radicalization and deradicalization which, in the words of 
Taylor and Horgan (2006), assumes that radicalized individuals 
and “terrorists are ordinary people (to the extent that they 
are not distinguishable from other “ordinary” people) who 
make choices in the contexts in which they find themselves” 
and “that choices made by individuals are meaningful for the 
person making those choices” (p.  588).
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